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EU Conditionality and Environmental Policy in South-eastern 
Europe 
Abstract. European Union engagement in South-eastern Europe (SEE) attempts to control the 
negative consequences of the collapse of the old communist regimes. These ȁsoft securityȂ 
concerns include justice and home affairs, environment, and energy. Through the transfer of 
policies and regulations, and by norm diffusion, the EU is able to operate beyond the borders 
of its formal, legal authority. In managing its perceived vulnerability, the EU imposes strict 
conditionality on countries in SEE. As enlargement stalls, and conditionality tightens, the 
expansion of EU governance sees curtailment of the possibilities of democratic engagement 
with the institutional structures of the EU. From an environmental perspective, EU 
engagement brings distinctive advantages: legislation has become more comprehensive, 
investment in environmental infrastructure has increased, and administrative structures 
have been modernised and devolved. This partly compensates for the lack of domestic 
interest in the environment. However, EU investment drives intensification and 
modernisation that brings new environmental pressures. In addition, while it promotes new 
styles of governance at home, the EU may help replicate traditional patterns of societal 
complacency in SEE, rather than promoting the civil society engagement needed to promote 
sustainable development.  
Susan Baker is Professor of Environmental Policy at the Cardiff School of Social Sciences and 
Co-Director of the Sustainable Places Research Institute, Cardiff University.  
Introduction 
This paper examines the environmental dimension of the European UnionȂs 
(EU) role in South-eastern Europe (SEE), taken to include Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovenia, and Turkey. However, the boundaries of SEE can vary greatly, 
depending on the political, economic, historical, cultural, and geographic lens 
adopted. Using a policy lens shows, for example, that Cyprus, Kosovo, and 
Turkey are not party to the important EU-led SEE Programme, discussed 
below. The SEE 2007-2013 Programme included 16 countries, eight of which 
are EU member states, six are candidate and potential candidates, and two are 
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countries participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy.1 Each receives 
funding from different instruments: European Regional Development Fund, 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and European Neighbourhood, 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). 2  An institutional lens highlights other 
boundaries, as Greece is a long-standing EU member and the years 2004 to 2013 
saw a Central and Eastern Europe enlargement that brought Slovenia and 
Cyprus into the EU, followed by the attainment of membership by Bulgaria, 
Romania, and subsequently Croatia. In the meantime, Albania, Montenegro, 
Serbia, the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey remain EU 
candidate countries, and the potential candidate country list includes Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. However, others, especially the former 
Soviet states that lie further east, are seen as ȁnear neighboursȂ, with their 
membership not a necessary outcome of the expansion of EU interest. 3 
Moldova, for example, is considered under the ENPI mentioned above, the 
framework instrument for implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
While these ȁnear neighboursȂ have the prospect of closer economic 
cooperation with the EU, in particular through trade, they are offered 
relationships with the EU that fall short of membership.  
 
The expansion of the EU sphere of influence in SEE, including engagement 
that may not necessarily result in EU membership, forms the focus of this 
paper. It explores the significance of EU governance, as it relates to institutional 
processes of norm diffusion and policy transfer. The empirical focus is on how 
this external governance plays out in the environmental policy arena. In SEE, 
the institutional and administrative capacity of national and local governments 
in the field of environmental policy is weak. The region is plagued by the 
legacy of years of unchecked pollution, resulting in several environmental 
problems, including urban air pollution, poor water quality, insufficient 
protection of biodiversity, inadequate waste management, alongside several 
pollution ȁhot spotsȂ.4 A decade of regional conflicts, combined with decaying 
                                                          
1   South East Europe Transnational Cooperation Programme, Balkan-Mediterranean 
Programme (2014-2020), http://www.southeast-europe.net/en/about_see/balkanmediter 
ranean/index. All internet references were accessed on 2 October 2015. 
2  Cf. the South East Europe Transnational Cooperation ProgrammeȂs website, 
http://www. southeast-europe.net/en/. 
3   Karen E. Smith, The EU and Central and Eastern Europe. The Absence of 
Interregionalism, European Integration Řŝ, No. ř ǻŘŖŖśǼ, řŚŝ-364. 
4  Frank Carter / David Turnock, eds, Environmental Problems of East Central Europe, 
London, New York 2002 (2nd ed); Susan Baker, Environmental Governance and EU 
Enlargement, in: Central and South-Eastern Europe 2011, London 2010 (10th ed) (The Europa 
Regional Surveys of the World). 
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industrial systems, has left the environment of the region in a state of serious 
neglect. 
 
While the EU has had considerable influence across the region, transition has 
been a complex process that has seen other external influences in operation.5 
Furthermore, transition is also ȁpath dependentȂ, involving a complex 
reworking at the domestic level of social, political and economic relations 
constructed under previous regimes,6 matters that also have to be taken into 
account in my analysis. This is against a backdrop of awareness that the region 
is characterised by states that are in the midst of serious debates over their 
national identities and the internal structure of the states, while still seeking to 
address the consequences of substantial violence and repressive authoritarian 
regimes that occurred in the post-communist period.7 
Geopolitical Interests of the EU 
EU engagement can be seen as an attempt to control the negative 
consequences of the political and economic transformation of Eastern Europe 
following the collapse of the old communist regime.8 These concerns have been 
consolidated as ȁsoft securityȂ issues, which include matters of justice and home 
affairs, environment and energy.9 In this context, EU involvement can be seen 
as an attempt to expand, in the face of these potential risks, the EU zone of 
peace and security eastward. 10  This is largely undertaken through the 
eastwards extension of EU regulatory and governance regimes.  
                                                          
5  Susan Baker, Environmental Governance and EU Enlargement. Developments in New 
Member States, the Western Balkans and the Near Neighbours, in: Central and South-Eastern 
Europe 2012, London 2011 (11th ed) (The Europa Regional Surveys of the World). 
6   Adrian Smith / John Pickles, Theorising Transition and the Political Economy of 
Transformation, inǱ John Pickles / Adrian Smith, eds, Theorising Transition. The Political 
Economy of Post-Communist Transformations, London 1998, 1-25. 
7  Paula M. Pickering, The Constraints on European InstitutionsȂ Conditionality in the 
Western Balkans, Europe-Asia Studies Ŝř, No. ŗŖ ǻŘŖŗŗǼ, ŗşřş-1944, 1939-40. 
8  Susan Baker, Environmental Governance. EU Influence beyond Its Borders, in: Central 
and South-Eastern Europe 2013, London 2012 (12th ed) (The Europa Regional Surveys of the 
World); Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Communication on the 
Development of Energy Policy for the Enlarged European Union, Its Neighbours and Partner 
Countries, COM (2003) 252 final, Brussels 2003; CEC, Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM 
(2005) 561 final, Brussels 2005. 
9  Sandra Lavenex, EU External Governance in ȁWider EuropeȂ, Journal of European Public 
Policy ŗŗ, No. Ś ǻŘŖŖŚǼ, ŜŞŖ-700. 
10   Gorazd Me:ko / Dejana Dimitrijević / Charles B. Fields, eds, Understanding and 
Managing Threats to the Environment in South Eastern Europe, Dordrecht 2011 (NATO 
Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security). 
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It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well governed. 
Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised 
crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its 
borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states 
increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task 
is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European 
Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close 
and cooperative relations. The importance of this is best illustrated by the 
Balkans.11 
 
In the environmental arena, the collapse of the old regimes highlighted the 
EUȂs perceived vulnerability in relation to nuclear risk, transboundary 
pollution, security of energy supply, moving more recently to concerns about 
water management and climate change. Through institutional processes of 
norm diffusion and policy transfer, the Commission of the European 
Communities (the Commission) aims to ensure that ȁEU legislation will 
become the principal and most effective means of international law making for 
most countries of the regionȂ, with the EU becoming ȁincreasingly the principal 
driving and coordinating force in the normative field for environmental 
improvement and sustainable development in EuropeȂ.12  
 
Establishing a zone of peace and security harks back to the founding 
principles of the EU, laid down in the immediate post-war period. This 
ȁpeaceful cooperationȂ is based on the achievement of regional economic 
integration through the expansion of the market economy and the acceptance 
of a common set of values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law.13 Enlargement, the Association politics and the European Neighbourhood 
policy, all discussed below, can be seen as an attempt to expand this neo-
functionalist model eastwards.  
 
The enlargements that took place from 2004 to 2013 offered a very direct and 
encompassing way for the EU to address its soft security concerns. It also 
ensured that EU-led reforms, including at the institutional level, became 
ȁlocked inȂ domestically, and thus protected against changes arising within 
                                                          
11  Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security 
Strategy, CL03-380EN, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/ cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
12  CEC, Communication on Pan-European Environmental Cooperation after the 2003 Kiev 
Conference, COM (2003) 62 final, Brussels 2003, 14-15. 
13  Ian Manners, Normative Power Europe. A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common 
Market Studies ŚŖ, No. Ř ǻŘŖŖŘǼ, Řřś-258. 
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domestic, electoral politics in transition countries.14 However, as enlargement 
fatigue grips existing member states,15 combined with growing concerns about 
the absorptive capacity of its institutions, the EU is faced increasingly with the 
task of defining its relations with its neighbours, some which may not be 
offered the prospect of EU membership, but which still play a crucial role in 
the maintenance of security and stability in Europe. Thus, while the EU 
accepted Croatia as a member state in 2013, this can only serve to highlight the 
difference between Croatia and the other western Balkan countries. 
Institutionalising Relationships 
Stabilisation and Association Process 
EU engagement in SEE deepened following the signature of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, known 
as the Dayton agreement. Following the conflict in Kosovo, in 1999 the EU 
launched the Stability Pact for SEE and in 2000 established the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) for the Western Balkans. Five Western Balkan 
countries were deemed ȁpotential candidatesȂ for the EU, a significant move in 
that prior to the launch of the SAP, EU enlargement plans made scant mention 
of the countries in the region.16 The Thessaloniki Summit 2003 was dedicated 
to EU-Western Balkans relations, and resulted in the Thessaloniki Agenda for 
the Western Balkans. Moving towards European integration reaffirmed the 
prospect of eventual EU membership, a prospect regarded as a powerful 
incentive promoting stability in the region, clearly stating that the ȁfuture of the 
Balkans is within the European UnionȂ.17 
 
The SAP provides the framework for EU negotiations with the Western 
Balkans. It has three aims: stabilizing countries and ensuring transition to a 
market economy; promoting regional cooperation; and providing for eventual 
                                                          
14  Ulrich Sedelmeier, Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of 
Institutional Change after EU Accession, West European Politics řś, No. ŗ ǻŘŖŗŘǼ, ŘŖ-38. 
15  Sandra Lavenex / Frank Schimmelfennig, EU Rules beyond EU Borders. Theorizing 
External Governance in European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy ŗŜ, No. Ŝ ǻŘŖŖşǼ, 
791-812; Pickering, The Constraints on European InstitutionsȂ Conditionality.  
16  David Phinnemore, Stabilisation and Association Agreements. Europe Agreements of 
the Western Balkans?, European Foreign Affairs Review 8 (2003), 77-103, 98. 
17   CEC, EU-Western Balkans Summit Thessaloniki, press release 10229/03, C/03/163, 
Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm. 
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membership of the EU.18 The link between political stability and economic 
development is clearly stated. The process is designed as a ȁroad mapȂ to help 
them, on an individual basis, build their capacity to adopt and implement EU 
law, as well as to reach European and international standards, including in 
relation to environmental matters. Once they have achieved what the EU 
deems as sufficient political and economic reform and administrative capacity, 
then a formal contractual Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) is 
signed. This reflects the EUȂs previous experience of Association Agreements 
with the accession states from Eastern Europe. The SAA with the FYROM came 
into force in 2004 and with Croatia in 2005. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia 
each signed an SAA in 2008. While Croatia joined the EU in 2013, the FYROM 
has still to move towards a second stage of SAA, and there has been no 
progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the October ŘŖŗŖ elections. AlbaniaȂs 
SAA entered into force in ŘŖŖş and MontenegroȂs in ŘŖŗŖ. In ŘŖŗŗ, the 
Commission recommended that Serbia be granted candidate country status, on 
the understanding that Serbia implements in good faith the agreements 
reached to date with Kosovo. 19  The Commission has also a framework 
agreement allowing Kosovo to participate in EU programmes.20  
 
The SAA is designed to help each country progress at its own pace towards 
greater European integration. An Agreement sets out rights and obligations, 
prioritises the reforms needed, details alignment with EU standards, and 
monitors their implementation through benchmarks. Environmental standards 
relate to EU priorities such as integrated water and flood management, 
prevention of environmental risks, transboundary cooperation in management 
of natural assets and protected areas, waste management, and energy 
efficiency. Agreements come with strict conditionality clauses.21 
 
Known as the Copenhagen Criteria, conditionality clauses include 
demonstrating the ability to implement a trade and cooperation agreement and 
                                                          
18  See CEC, The Western Balkans on the Road to the EU. Consolidating Stability and 
Raising Prosperity, COM (2006) 27, Brussels, 27 January 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/ EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:r12650. 
19  CEC, Commission Opinion on SerbiaȂs Application for Membership of the European 
Union, COM(2011) 668 final, Brussels, 20 October 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/ 
key_documents/2011/package/sr_rapport_2011_en.pdf. 
20   CEC, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012, COM(2011) 666 final, 
Brussels, 12 October 2011, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/ 
strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf. 
21  David Phinnemore, Stabilisation and Association Agreements. European Agreements of 
the Western Balkans?, European Foreign Affairs Review 8 (2003), 77-103, 88. 
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meet political standards, including respect for democratic principles, human 
rights, and the rule of law. Conditionality focuses on two main arenas of 
reforms. The first, democratic conditionality, relates to the adoption of the 
political principles of the EU, the norms of human rights and of liberal 
democracy. The second type, acquis conditionality involves the transposition of 
the body of EU legislation, codes and practices, known as the acquis 
communautaire, eastwards. 22  While acquis conditionality initially dealt with 
regulatory alignment with the EU internal market, over time, the focus 
widened to other policy areas. Attention further shifted from a narrow 
preoccupation with the legal transposition of rules and regulations to a broader 
set of requirements around implementation capacity.23 As a result, effort was 
concentrated on the establishment of institutional and administrative 
arrangements, monitoring capabilities and the devolution of implementation 
tasks downwards to the subnational level, 24  which in turn requires major 
restructuring of domestic centre/local relations. Regional cooperation, 
promoting good neighbourly relations, is seen as an important conditionality 
principle for closer institutional affiliation with the EU.25 
 
Conditionality also includes the operation of more diffuse influences, such 
as persuasion and learning, in which EU actors socialise Eastern European 
actors rather than coerce them. Twinning is a good example of this more diffuse 
form. The leading EU environmental states (Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden) have been particularly active in twinning projects aligned with the 
IPA and ENPI programmes. Twinning involves the sharing of good practices 
developed within the EU member states with public administrations in 
transition countries. It has been used by leader environmental states to 
promote the eastward transfer of environmental best practice, procedures, and 
expertise. It is hoped that through such ȁsoftȂ mechanisms eastern bureaucrats 
will ȁinternaliseȂ EU norms and practices. This form of conditionality has 
                                                          
22 See Susan Baker, Environmental Governance and EU Enlargement. Developments in 
New Member States, the Western Balkans and the Near Neighbours, in: Central and 
SouthEastern Europe 2010, London 2009 (9th ed.) (The Europa Regional Surveys of the 
World); and Susan Baker, Environmental Governance. EU Influence beyond Its Borders, in: 
Central and South-Eastern Europe 2013, London 2012 (12th ed.), for details on how these 
played out in different policy arenas and across different countries. 
23  Frank Schimmelfennig / Ulrich Sedelmeier, Governance by Conditionality. EU Rule 
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public 
Policy ŗŗ, No. Ś ǻŘŖŖŚǼ, ŜŜŗ-679. 
24  Ian Bache, Europeanization and Multi-Level Governance. EU Cohesion Policy and 
PreAccession Aid in Southeast Europe, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies ŗŖ, No. ŗ 
(2010), 1-12, DOI: 10.1080/14683851003606739. 
25  CEC, A Secure Europe in a Better World. 
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become increasingly prevalent in some of the eastern and southern neighbours 
that lack membership prospects.26 It plays an important role in norm diffusion 
around the EUȂs rim. 
 
For its part, the EU offers compliant countries a mixture of trade concessions, 
economic and financial assistance, and assistance for reconstruction, 
development, and stabilisation. EU financial assistance, especially the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), targets the priorities set out in 
the partnerships arrangements. 27  The IPA covers both the candidate and 
potential candidate countries and is administered through the EUȂs Western 
Balkans Investment Framework. 28  The EU invokes programme and project 
conditionality through freezing financial flows if a country fails to meet 
objectives. 29  However, in addition to IPA funding, regions receive funding 
through EU Regional Policy, with the Territorial Cooperation Objective of the 
EUȂs cohesion policy supporting cooperation along the internal borders of the 
EU, while the European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument supports 
cooperation between EU regions and regions of the EUȂs external neighbours. 
This cooperation focuses on several key areas, including the environment and 
economic growth.30  
 
However, over time, the Commission has come to believe that SAAs could 
prove an alternative to the European Agreements that in the case of central 
Europe lead to EU membership. It now promotes institutionalised regional 
cooperation short of EU enlargement. This process has been referred to as the 
ȁextraterritorialisationȂ of the EU.31 Extra-territorialisation, occurring through 
the ȁtemplateȂ agreements, involves counties implementing EU driven 
political, economic and institutional reform, including aligning legislation with 
                                                          
26  Tanja Börzel / Yasemin Pamuk, Pathologies of Europeanisation. Fighting Corruption in 
the Southern Caucasus, West European Politics řś, No. ŗ ǻŘŖŗŘǼ, ŝş-97. 
27  CEC, The European Commission and EU Policy towards South East Europe, Brussels 
2009, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/gen/ecrole.htm; CEC, European  
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. Overview—Instrument for 
PreAccession Assistance, Brussels 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/ index_en.htm. 
28  Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIS), About WBIS, https://www.wbif.eu/ 
About%20WBIF; and WBIS, Environment, https://www.wbif.eu/Sectors/Environment. 
29   William Bartlett, Regional Integration and Free-Trade Agreements in the Balkans. 
Opportunities, Obstacles, and Policy Issues, Economic Change and Restructuring 42 (2009), 25-
46. 
30  European Union Interact, European Territorial Cooperation, 1 October 2013, 
http://www. interact-eu.net/etc_2014/european_territorial_cooperation/486/14849. 
31  Lavenex, EU External Governance in ȁWider EuropeȂ. 
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the EU acquis.32 Viewed in this light, SAAs allow the EU to extend its regulatory 
reach to address areas where it perceives itself to be vulnerable. However, as 
conditionality became increasingly de-coupled from membership, the EU 
began to operate what became known as ȁpolicy conditionalityȂ. This is where 
it offers intermediate benefits associated with compliance, such as market 
access or the liberalisation of visa regimes. 33  Policy conditionality is often 
supported by technical and financial assistance from the EU. Introducing a 
narrower policy focus has allowed conditionality to remain credible at the 
domestic level, by offering tangible, and often domestically popular rewards, 
such as the lifting of restrictions on travel visas. 34  In the context of this 
reshaping of the EUȂs relations with SEE countries, in ŘŖŖŞ the Stability Pact 
for SEE was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC).  
Re-Thinking Regional Cooperation  
Unlike previous top-down, EU-led arrangements, the RCC is promoted as a 
regionally owned and led framework. Its key role is ȁto generate and coordinate 
developmental projects of a wider, regional character and to create an 
appropriate political climate susceptible to their implementationȂ.35 However, 
it still focuses on regional cooperation in SEE in the context of EU integration.36 
This generates mixed messages, and could serve to widen the gap between 
membership aspirations of SEE countries and EU responses.  
 
The SEE 2020 strategy is the key policy document to emerge to date from the 
RCC. The strategy aims to create jobs and prosperity in a European perspective 
for the Western Balkans. 37  It has five pillars: Smart Growth, emphasising 
education, innovation, research, and development; Sustainable Growth, 
focusing on economic sustainability through enterprise, exports, energy 
efficiency, and the development of integrated transport networks; Inclusive 
                                                          
32  CEC, Commission Communication on Wider Europe-Neighbourhood. A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003), 104 
final, Brussels, ŗŗ March ŘŖŖř, ŗŖ, httpǱ//eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/pdf/comŖř_ŗŖŚ_en.pdf. 
33  Florian Trauner, From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality. EU External 
Governance in South Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy ŗŜ, No. ś ǻŘŖŖşǼ, ŝŝŚ-
790. 
34  Ulrich Sedelmeier, The EU and Democratization in Central and Southeastern Europe 
since 1989, in: Sabrina P. Ramet, ed, Central and Southeastern European Politics since 1989, 
Cambridge 2010, 519-535. 
35  Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), Overview, http://www.rcc.int/pages/6/2/overview. 
36  RCC, Overview. 
37  RCC, South East European 2020 Strategy. Jobs and Prosperity in a European Perspective, 
November 2013, http://www.rcc.int/files/user/docs/reports/SEE2020-Strategy.pdf.  
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Growth, supporting employment, social inclusion, good health, and well-
being; Integrated Growth, promoting closer regional integration in terms of 
trade and investment; and Governance for Growth, including developing 
effective public services and fighting against corruption.38  
Infrastructure and Environment form part of the Sustainable Growth pillar 
of the Strategy.39 It includes measures to reduce energy intensity, support the 
modernisation of transportation, increase resource efficiency, and improve 
environmental management. These aim to boost growth and build a strong, 
diversified, and competitive economic base in the region. At the same time, the 
aim is to ensure that countries become more sustainable, and more resource 
efficient, with improvement in overall transport efficiency, that facilitates 
competitiveness in industries based on wood, biodiversity and food 
processing, as well as related industries, which constitutes a future regional 
competitive advantage.40 
 
The EU closely monitors the progress of SEE 2020, including through annual 
progress reports. The strategy is also aligned with the IPA mentioned above, 
and there are clear links between the measures proposed and the relevant 
chapter of the EU acquis. This serves to highlight the influence that the EU is 
having on the shape of key policy developments, while at the same time 
making us mindful of the uncertainties surrounding that relationship.  
 
The strategy is heavily influenced by the EUȂs Europe ŘŖŘŖ Strategy,41 both 
in terms of acceptance of growth-orientated development as their overriding 
principle and in relation to specific issues addressed. Both strategies make 
environmental considerations subservient to economic goals, rather than 
seeing them as ends in themselves. This ecological modernisation perspective 
perceives growth as the precondition for environmental and social progress. 
This assumption is at odds with the adoption of an integrative approach to 
ecology, economy and society and the related rejection of traditional growth-
                                                          
38  RCC, South East European ŘŖŘŖ Strategy. Jobs and Prosperityǲ see also Börzel / Pamuk, 
Pathologies of Europeanisation. 
39  RCC, South East European 2020 Strategy. Infrastructure and Environnent, http://www. 
rcc.int/pages/69/infrastructure-and-environment. 
40  RCC, South East European 2020 Strategy. Infrastructure and Environnent. 
41   CEC, EUROPE 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, 
COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels 2010, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:201 0:2020:FIN:EN:PDF.  
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oriented development that form the backbone of the principles of sustainable 
development, and as is written into the EU treaty.42  
 
The EU has long since given mixed messages about the type of economic 
development it supports in transition countries.43 EU funding instruments are 
a prime source of such policy inconsistency. The now superseded Special 
Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) 
funded the extension of the Common Agricultural Policy to the east. It 
attracted criticism for promoting intensive agriculture and displacing the 
environmental advantages associated with low-intensity farm-management 
practices. 44  Similarly, ISPA has been criticised for its failure to safeguard 
environmental criteria. The fund prioritised large-scale sewage and 
wastewater treatment projects, rather than the low technology, low-cost 
biological treatment that is more suitable for the plethora of small, rural 
communities in the region.45  
 
So far, this paper has addressed EU engagement in SEE, in particular through 
the imposition of conditionality. Attention has been given to the shifting 
context of conditionality as, over time, benefits of compliance changed from 
the original assurance of EU membership to the offer of more intermediate, 
policy focused rewards. This generates uncertainty as to the ultimate outcomes 
of compliance, while also highlighting the dominant role that the EU plays in 
shaping these outcomes. Attention has also been given to the multiple, and 
often contradictory nature of EU aims and objectives for the region, especially 
the gap between its economic policies and its sustainable development 
commitments. However, this still leaves the question: what roles do states in 
SEE play in shaping the EU relations with the region, or to put matters another 
way, why do they comply with EU conditionality?  
 
Why Comply? 
                                                          
42   Susan Baker, European Union Environmental Policy, in: The European Union 
Encyclopaedia and Directory 2015, London 2014 (2nd ed.). 
43  Susan Baker, Environmental Governance. EU Influence beyond Its Borders, in: Central 
and South-Eastern Europe 2013, London 2012 (12th ed.). 
44   CEE Bankwatch Network / Friends of the Earth Europe ǻFoEEǼ, Billions for 
Sustainability? The Use of EU Pre-Accession Funds and Their Environmental and Social 
Implications, Brussels, October 2000, 
http://bankwatch.org/documents/BillionsforSustainability.pdf. 
45  Susan Baker, Environmental Governance and EU Enlargement, in: Central and 
SouthEastern Europe 2011, London 2010 (10th ed.). 
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Domestic compliance with EU conditionality is conceptualised in two ways. 
The first, called the external incentives model, is based on the argument that 
actors engage in rational cost-benefit calculations. In this, benefiters weight up 
the external incentives provided by the EU to comply with its conditions.46 
Material cost-benefit calculations take account of access to markets, economic 
development from foreign direct investment and budgetary transfers. The 
strong hand of the EU also provides an important way for governments to 
legitimise difficult and potentially unpopular political choices at home. The 
influence of the EU also depends on a favourable constellation of domestic 
factors, including whether compliance suits the preferences of key actors, 
especially from the business sector.47 For some, closer ties with the EU are also 
part of their aspiration to ȁthe return to EuropeȂ and their desire to cast off an 
ȁeasternȂ identity. Having, ultimately, a voice in EU decision-making also 
provides a strong instrumental argument in support of a countryȂs compliance 
strategy. For those without prospects of EU membership, benefits, including 
support in attracting foreign direct investment, can help to solve a particular 
problem or can help promote competitive advantage more generally.48 Host 
countries are also more likely to comply when the EU lays down clear and 
targeted actions aimed at particular sectors. 49  In addition, the chance of 
compliance is greater the more binding the rules laid down by the EU are.50 
 
The second way in which compliance is conceptualised, the constructivist 
approach, argues that social learning drives compliance, and that different 
actors are motivated to comply by internalised identities, values, and norms.51 
In this model, reforms are driven by normative changes brought about through 
                                                          
46  Trauner, From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality, 776. 
47  Esther Ademmer / Tanja Börzel, Migration, Energy and Good Governance in the EUȂs 
Eastern Neighbourhood, Europe-Asia Studies Ŝś, No. Ś ǻŘŖŗřǼ, śŞŗ-608; Liliana B. Andonova, 
Transnational Politics of the Environment. EU Integration and Environmental Policy in 
Eastern Europe, Cambridge/MA. ŘŖŖŚǲ Julia Langbein / Tanja Börzel, Introduction. 
Explaining Policy Change in the European UnionȂs Eastern Neighbourhood, Europe-Asia 
Studies Ŝś, No. Ś ǻŘŖŗřǼ, śŝŗ-580; Ulrich Sedelmeier, Enlargement. Constituent Policy and 
Tool for External Governance, inǱ Helen Wallace / Mark A. Pollack / Alasdair R. Young, eds, 
Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford 2015 (7th ed), 407-435.  
48   For further details see Tanja Börzel / Thomas Risse, When Europeanisation Meets 
Diffusion. Exploring New Territory, West European Politics řś, No. ŗ ǻŘŖŗŘǼ, ŗşŘ-207. 
49  Wade Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO. Ordering from the 
Menu in Central Europe, Cambridge 2004. 
50  Lavenex / Schimmelfennig, EU Rules Beyond EU Borders. 
51  Trauner, From Membership Conditionality to Policy Conditionality, 777. 
384  Susan Baker 
socialisation of actors,52 such as is mentioned above in the case of twinning. The 
International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR) also 
provides an interesting example, including in its use of a network of expert 
groups.53 
 
The external incentive model is seen as having the most explanatory power 
in interpreting the transfer and adoption of EU rules by countries including 
those in SEE. However, while there is merit to this rationalist account, which 
focuses on the material, distributional consequences of compliance, it ignores 
a crucial aspect of EU engagement. The use of conditionality has never been 
based on the exercise of political or economic equality. The scope for ȁoutsidersȂ 
to influence the content of the conditionality clauses remains severely limited, 
because EU conditionality starts from predetermined, non-negotiable, formal 
rules decided in advance by the member states.54 In this context, rule transfer 
eastwards and southwards is characterised by a top-down process, as detailed 
and monitored by the Commission. In addition, while both east and west are 
interdependent, the interdependency is highly asymmetrical, balanced in 
favour of the EU.55 Thus we see considerable attention paid by the EU to issues 
of ȁsoft securityȂ that threaten the EU internally, especially justice and home 
affairs, trafficking and smuggling, public order, judicial reform, external 
border control and border security, and transboundary pollution. These issues 
remain central in financial and other assistance programmes.56 Migration and 
border security, and environment policies are all under strong adaptation 
pressure from the EU.57 In addition, the countries of SEE are only of marginal 
importance to the EU economy, while they will benefit much more strongly 
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from formal, economic, and market ties with the EU, far more so than any 
benefits that will potentially accrue to existing member states. This gives the 
EU an upper hand in leveraging conditionality.  
 
At the same time, the effectiveness of EU conditionality in driving reforms 
depends on maintaining the belief that these countries have a genuine chance 
of eventually securing EU membership. EU policy for the Western Balkans has 
also to demonstrate its power of transformation in a region where states are 
weak and societies divided. There are large differences between the countries 
in terms of their readiness for eventual EU membership. These differences 
notwithstanding, nearly all of them are poorer than the member states that 
acceded in 2004. In addition, the area suffers from several environmental 
problems, including poor water management, growing problems of pollution, 
including in cities, poor management of hazardous and radioactive waste, 
illegal dumping, and deepening threats to biodiversity. The ability of the EU 
to establish institutional order in its neighbourhood without at the same time 
expanding its membership is therefore not guaranteed. This order has been 
shown to be more sectorally fragmented and differentiated and less 
Europeanised than the order projected though enlargement. 53  The 
questionable promise of membership and uncertain time-horizon limits the 
impact of conditionality, despite the offer of ȁintermediaryȂ rewards as a 
counter-balancing measure. EU policy thus creates uncertainty in the region. 
This uncertainty can be clearly seen in relation to environmental policy. 
The Environmental Policy Arena 
The acquis communautaire contains an impressive body of legal acts covering 
an array of environmental matters, from water and air quality, to waste 
management, nature protection, industrial pollution, risk management, 
chemicals, and noise; legislation that exists mostly in the form of directives. 
Making the adoption of the environmental acquis a conditionality clause gives 
the EU an important way in which it can exercise its influence over 
environmental governance in the region.54 This is particularly the case given 
the differences between the EU environmental acquis and the pre-existing 
environmental legislation in the former communist states. The acquis has a 
wider range, bringing many new areas of consumption and production activity 
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under its regulatory reach. It adopts a different regulatory approach, in 
particular in relation to integrated pollution prevention and control. It deals 
not just with environmental processes but also environmentally related 
product standards. The EU uses a wider range of implementation tools, 
including voluntary agreements, and requires new monitoring and reporting 
systems and standards. It is also supported by ȁhorizontalȂ regulations, that cut 
across different areas rather than merely dealing with a specific sector, and 
which are often more procedural. Conditionality also sees countries clarifying 
plans for strengthening implementation capacity within environmental 
inspectorates and among local authorities.55  
 
At times, the conditionality clauses has run against national wishes. Bulgaria, 
for example, long resisted the closure of units of the unsafe Kozloduy nuclear 
plant. However, it was forced to shift its stance to start accession talks with 
Brussels, given EU warnings that it must agree to the closure of units of the 
reactors if it wants to accede to the Union.56 However, the decision has always 
been unpopular domestically.  
 
One route through which the EU has exercised its influence is through 
promoting and funding regional cooperation to address transboundary 
pollution and the management of shared, natural resources, such as rivers. The 
EU has become increasingly active in international fora around the Baltic, 
Mediterranean, and Black seas as well as in conventions and protocols under 
the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe. 57 The European 
Commission works hard to ensure the treaties that stem from these 
conventions harmonise with EU law and policy. The EU Strategy for the 
Danube Region (EUSDR), for example, a macro-regional strategy adopted by 
the European Commission in 2010, includes several SEE countries and is 
strongly influenced by the Europe 2020 strategy. This includes a focus on 
ensuring competitiveness in the region through improving mobility and inter-
modality of inland waterways.58 Fora of regional environmental cooperation 
thus act as a vehicle for policy transfer and norm diffusion from the EU to states 
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around its perimeter. 59  The adoption of the EU Marine Strategy in 2007 
enhanced the EUȂs drive to ensure legislative harmonisation among its 
neighbours, as is also the case with the implementation of measures within the 
Danube River Management Plan.60 An excellent example can be seen when the 
Commission sponsored an international conference, convened in February 
2006 by Ukraine, with Romania and Moldova, under the auspices of the 
Danube Commission. The conference resulted in agreement to implement a 
river basin management plan for the Danube Delta based on the EU Water 
Framework Directive.61  
 
An integral part of the use of conditionality is the production of regular 
reports by the Commission, which list chapter by chapter how well each 
country is doing in relation to the transposition of the acquis and in terms of the 
provision and extension of supporting institutional and administrative 
capacity. In relation to environmental matters, these would typically include 
the identification of institutional weaknesses, leading to requirements for 
administrative and institutional reform, including the establishment of 
separate Ministries of the Environment, a national EPA and of consultative fora 
as well as the upgrading of the capacity of sub-national government and of the 
environmental inspectorates. Legislative gaps, often in relation to what are 
known as investment intensive environmental directives, are regularly 
reported.62 These reports typically lead to a listing of policy priorities that have 
to be met, sometimes within the year. In turn, the regular reports are used by 
the Council to inform their decision as to whether to admit a country to further 
stages in the accession process.  
 
This system of careful monitoring and regular shaming led to the 
identification of environmental ȁleadersȂ and ȁlaggardsȂ and the ranking of 
countries, including the candidates, in relation to each other. Conditionality 
therefore played a particularly blunt role: 
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Its main value is thus as a shock tactic, to embarrass applicant governments into 
making dramatic changes owing to the domestic repercussions of failing to meet a 
major foreign policy goal. This results in ȁshamingȂ whereby governments are 
embarrassed into complying with EU requirements [...].63  
 
Yet, the reports always remained vague in their details, typically using 
expressions like ȁimprovements have to be madeȂ, or ȁgreater effortsȂ are 
needed in particular, named areas. They rarely provide specifications, such as 
quantified targets or identify particular procedures for achieving 
conditionality compliance. This gives the EU a distinctive advantage: it allows 
it to maintain control over the ultimate outcome of conditionality compliance, 
such that the ultimate prize, EU membership, can be retained as a political 
choice and not the inevitable outcome of a technical process. In addition, it 
allows the EU to distinguish between fast and slow reformers, such that in the 
past Bulgaria and Romania had to wait until 2001 and 2002 respectively to 
begin negotiations and membership was delayed until 2007.64 Conditionality 
clauses allow the EU to play a gate-keeping role and to retain control over 
access to negotiations, to set the timetable for how fast or slow a country could 
progress along the various stages of its relationship with the EU, and ultimately 
to set the limits of the access process. As such, this reveals how conditionality 
is a political tool, involving the exercise of power, and not a technical process 
resulting in a predetermined outcome.  
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Environmental conditionality brings distinctive advantages: environmental 
legislation has become more comprehensive; there has been an increase in 
investments in environmental infrastructure; and administrative structures 
have been modernised and devolved, resulting in increased implementation 
capacity.70 However, states have also encountered major challenges in 
implementing the environmental acquis, owing to the breadth and complexity 
of the legislation and policies involved and their high financial costs. The EU 
Water Framework Directive, for example, as mentioned above, is investment 
intensive and very difficult to implement as it requires considerable expertise, 
is cross sectoral, and often requires good transboundary cooperation. To 
ensure implementation, the EU has tended to focus on tangible expressions of 
capacity within the system of public administration, such as the purchasing of 
equipment or the establishment of enforcement and monitoring procedures.71 
This focus on the bureaucratic dimension has tended to displace concern with 
achieving good environmental outcomes. This brings attention to matters in 
relation to how conditionality is governed.  
Whither Democratic Governance? 
In discussing extra-territorialisation, it is useful to distinguish between the 
internal dimensions and external dimensions of EU governance. Internal 
governance refers to the creation of rules and their implementation within the 
EU, while the latter refers to the transfer of these rules and their adoption by 
non-member states.  
 
In relation to the internal dimensions of governance, the EU has been variously 
described as a system of multi-level governance, that is, a system of 
overlapping competencies and actor engagements among multiple levels of 
governments65 and as multi-centred, that is, with competing and overlapping 
EU institutions, a lack of clear central authority operating within an array of 
complex networks. 66  It is increasingly seen as a system promoting new 
governance, particularly network governance. Here, governance is seen to be 
more about bargaining between different actors, across different territorial 
levels of government, and between the public and private sectors, than about 
the automatic implementation of commands from the centre. In this model of 
governance, policy transfer, lesson learning, including the use of the ȁopenȂ 
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method of coordination, are supposed to encourage experimental learning and 
deliberative problem solving across the EU, rather than enforced convergence 
from the top. 
 
In contrast, if we look at how the EU is transferring its rules to the east, then 
claims that the EU promotes new governance are weakened. EU policy style 
towards potential candidates and its near neighbours indicates that EU 
governance is still largely about securing compliance with EU laws and 
regulations, formal and structured decision-making, greater convergence and 
standardisation.67 In addition, EU regulation is highly prescriptive. This style 
mirrors EU engagement with central Europe in the period leading up to and 
during the 2004-2013 enlargements: 
 
The EU not only told Eastern European applicants what they should do—in terms 
of, say, new legislation or administrative reform—but also sent representatives to 
specific ministries to make sure that the changes were being made as prescribed 
through the ȁtwinningȂ programme. The whole process of adjustment was carefully 
monitored. The champions and laggards among the applicant countries were 
identified at regular review sessions. [...] Those states that failed to meet the EUȂs 
conditions were kept at bay through trade quotas and tariffs and the Schengen 
regime.68 
The way in which the EU managed the accession process, and continues to 
structure its spheres of influence in SEE, leaves little space for the flexibility, 
tolerance and voluntarism that are seen as the hallmarks of new governance. 
EU relations to the east and south are more akin to ȁoldȂ governance, as evident 
by the highly asymmetrical relation between insiders and outsiders, the 
imposition of predetermined rules, the focus on the participation of 
bureaucratic actors, and use of top-down communication structures.76 
 
In the pre-accession process, aspiring applicants had to adopt the acquis, but 
good behaviour and compliance could lead to eventual EU membership and 
ultimately to a say in shaping future rules and decisions. Thus, the prospects 
for democratic engagement with the institutions and policymaking process of 
the EU remained intact. However, where there is no prospect of EU 
membership, such democratisation options are not available.69 The outcome 
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may well be ȁever greater disassociation between authoritative allocation, 
functional competencies and territorial constituenciesȂ.70 
 
Concern that rules transfer will remain an entirely asymmetrical process is 
expressed alongside other concerns about the impact of the EU on the 
development of domestic civil society, including at the organisational level.71 
There is also a sense in which EU engagement empowers actors within 
government, especially given the institutional focus, rather than within civil 
society.72 In addition, the EU exercises strong influence over environmental 
NGOs in the regions. It sets a significant proportion of their agendas and 
shapes the means and conditions of activism itself. Some have argued that EU 
influence on NGOs in the region has served to restrict their agenda, sever 
contact with the grass roots, and reduce their engagement in local activism.73  
 
The limited role played by environmental NGOs reflects the EU style of 
interest mediation. Like other Directorates-General, the Environment 
Directorate-General favours centralised policy-making, seeking input largely 
from technical and scientific advisers. In addition, the Commission has 
developed semi-clientelistic relationships with industry and business interests. 
The fact that many countries in the region themselves favour narrow, technical 
and scientific approaches towards environmental policy will only increase this 
tendency to enhance ȁEurocraticȂ policy-making.82 Countries in SEE tend to 
have strong, centralised state structures and a weak civil society, features that 
promote clientelistic relations. In this context, there is a real danger that the gap 
between EU environmental policy and the concerns of citizens will widen 
further. 
 
We argue that negotiations between bureaucrats do not necessarily lead to 
environmental improvement, as is evident by the continued environmental 
deterioration that is occurring in the region and, equally significantly, within 
the EU itself. Thus, while the system of environmental governance has 
improved, it is unlikely that these positive benefits will counterbalance the 
negative environmental consequences of EU driven economic restructuring 
and modernisation processes. These processes have threatened biodiversity, 
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tipped the modal split in transport towards private car use and brought 
destruction to the more environmentally favourable traditional agricultural 
practices of the region. This contradictory outcome lends strength to the 
argument that the EU primarily acts as a regulatory agent, promoting stronger 
environmental management, while downplaying engagement with the 
transformative requirement embedded in the commitment to promote 
sustainable development. While strengthened environmental regulation and 
administrative capacity will enhance societyȂs ability to address the negative 
environmental consequences of economic activity, it will not compensate for 
growth orientated economic development strategies, nor will it encourage 
society to find new ways to engage with the more fundamental, transformative 
task of reconstructing a new relationship between the economy, ecology and 
society. The EU governance style, by giving preference to technical experts and 
administrative procedures, may in fact replicate traditional patterns of societal 
complacency, rather than promote civil society engagement in the promotion 
of sustainable futures. 
 
EU influence is not evenly felt, however, and, as Jacobs has argued, influence 
clearly depends on how well entrenched domestic structures are, and the 
strength of domestic politics and social opposition to institutional 
transformation.74 Indeed, there are plenty of examples of the limits of EUȂs 
influence, including on Belarus, in Slovakia under the government of Vladimir 
Mečiar, when the EU was forced to exclude Slovakia from opening accession 
negotiations in 1998, or in Croatia under Tudjman during the 1990s.75  
Conclusion 
EU policy towards SEE involves conditionality, a bargaining strategy 
involving reinforcement by reward. Rewards vary, ranging from financial and 
technical assistance through to the establishment of institutional ties. 
Institutional ties can themselves range from trade and cooperation agreements 
to full membership of the EU.  
Enlargement is one of the EUȂs most powerful policy tools. It has enabled the 
EU to help stabilise Central and Southeastern Europe and consolidate its 
transition to democracy and neoliberal, market economies. The adoption of 
acquis conditionality gives the EU a particularly important means of exercising 
its influence. Environmental legislation has become more comprehensive, new 
investments have been achieved, and administrative structures have been 
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modernised and devolved. The acquis ties countries into an environmental 
regulatory, monitoring, and reporting regime that has partly compensated for 
the lack of domestic interest in the environment. Nevertheless, the danger 
exists that the EU style of interest mediation, which gives preference to 
technical experts and administrative procedures, may replicate traditional 
patterns of societal complacency, rather than promoting the development of 
civil society engagement. Equally problematically, EU driven economic 
restructuring and modernisation processes have contributed to a rise of 
consumer culture and the propagation of new sources of pollution and waste. 
 
Tying an increasing number of its neighbours into an environmental 
regulatory, monitoring and reporting regime helps the EU to manage its 
perceived vulnerability in relation to several ȁsoft securityȂ issues. It is through 
rule expansion, norm diffusion and the transfer of policies and regulations that 
the EU is able to operate beyond the borders of its formal, legal authority. The 
gradual extension of EU governance beyond the circle of member states is 
blurring the borders of the EU, helping it to manage its perceived vulnerability 
in relation to its ȁsoft securityȂ issues. However, the expansion of the EUȂs 
governance regime is matched by a curtailment of the possibilities of 
democratic engagement with the institutional structures of the EU. 76  The 
emergence of these ȁpatterns of differentiated integrationȂ has profound 
consequences for the democratisation of transition processes in SEE.  
 
There is a strong sense in which transition has been shaped by the desire on 
behalf of Eastern European states to strengthen their links with the EU and reap 
what they perceive as the positive benefits of such a liaison. However, given 
the asymmetrical relationship that exists between the EU and the eastern and 
southern countries, this focus on the material, distributional consequences of 
enlargement for individual member state actors is rather narrow. It ignores the 
high volume and intrusiveness of the rules attached to that relationship, which 
has allowed the EU an unprecedented influence on the restructuring of 
domestic institutions and the entire range of public policies across the region.77 
This influence has spread from ECE to SEE and increasingly to the so-called 
ȁnear neighboursȂ.  
 
EU actions to the east and the south can be seen as a further example of the 
EU acting as a civilian power. This is the exercise of soft power by the EU, 
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through political, economic, and normative means.78 This understanding of the 
EU as a normative power has grown in popularity. However, the requirement 
to adopt the acquis and the use of conditionality goes beyond the voluntarism 
implicit in the notion of civilian power. This is particularly the case when they 
are applied to third counties, which lack the prospect of EU membership. Here 
the attempt to extend the EUȂs legal and regulatory boundary is not simply a 
benevolent projection of acquired civilian virtues but ȁa strategic attempt to 
gain control over policy development through external governanceȂ.79 
Despite having developed a wide range of mechanisms to structure the 
transition process, including conditionality, the EU cannot precisely target 
complex changes in institutional frameworks within the transition states. In 
addition, I have only looked at the role of top-down, elite driven processes in 
shaping transition, but am mindful of the role that citizens and NGOs play, 
and how citizen engagement and activism also play a role in shaping the 
outcomes of conditionality.80 
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